Volume 116
Issue 4 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 116,
2011-2012
3-1-2012

Empathy for the Devil: How Prisoners Got a New Property Rig
Marianne Sawicki

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Marianne Sawicki, Empathy for the Devil: How Prisoners Got a New Property Rig, 116 DICK. L. REV. 1209
(2012).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol116/iss4/8

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

Empathy for the Devil: How Prisoners Got
a New Property Right
Marianne Sawicki*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit opened a
"can of worms" when it declared "a new property right" for prisoners in
Rodney Burns v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.' The court
held that assessing a charge against the funds in an inmate account
2
impairs a cognizable property interest even before the actual deduction.
Constitutional due-process protections attach to this newly recognized
"right to security." 3 The Burns worms are bait for the hooks on two lines
of inquiry. First, against a tide of judicial deference toward prison
administrators, how did the Third Circuit reach this surprising result?
Second, in its wake, what changes in prison disciplinary procedures
should occur?
An analysis of the Burns decision will establish that the court
adopted an empathetic stance toward the prisoner-appellant because it
relied on an analogy to something familiar: the relation between a debtor
and a judgment creditor.4 The court declined to demonize the prisoner
rhetorically, as commonly happens when a prisoner files a complaint

* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2012. The author extends heartfelt thanks to Su Ming Yeh, Esq., and Jennifer
Tobin, Esq., of the Pennsylvania Institutional Law Project, who generously gave advice
during the initial stages of the research for this article, and to Professors Jamison E.
Colburn, Marie T. Reilly, and Thomas M. Place of the Dickinson School of Law, who
offered insightful critique of earlier formulations of the analysis.
1. Bums v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 291, 294 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hardiman, J.,
dissenting). The appeals court initially used a variant spelling of the principal
defendant's name, apparently following the Complaint as filed pro se. Subsequent court
documents and briefs use "PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS." This irregularity
has been adjusted here for clarity.
2. Id. at 281 (majority opinion).
3. Id. at 291, 286.
4. Id at 288. See also Oral Argument at 9:35, Bums v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544
F.3d 279 (No. 07-1678), available at http://www.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/
07-1678Burnsv.PaDeptofCorrections.wma.
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about prison conditions.5 Empathy plays an unavoidable, if often
unrecognized, role in human decision making. 6 But empathy generates
bias in legal decisions only where the court, unaware of empathy's
function, allows it to work in a one-sided manner. A jurisprudence of
empathy actively compensates for unfamiliarity with the perspectives
and conditions of any party, especially one whose circumstances differ
socially from those of judges. 8 The Burns decision sheds light on other
decisions where courts have rejected prisoners' assertions of
constitutional claims. 9
Before analyzing Burns, this Comment provides background with a
survey of the landmark cases that define due process rights for prisoners.
Although "[t]here is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and
the prisons of this country,'o incarceration brings limitations to
constitutional rights. Those limits, imposed by the United States
Supreme Court, bind state courts as well. Pennsylvania precedents
provide part of the legal background for Burns because state law governs
administrative procedures and regulations that affect prisoners in state
correctional institutions." While the judicial rulings and administrative
law of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania do not bind other states, there
is no reason to doubt that they are comparable to those of other states.
The Third Circuit's holding in Burns is binding precedent for federal
courts within that circuit, and it may be persuasive elsewhere because it
addresses "an issue of first impression across the courts of appeals." 2

5. See infra Part III.C. To demonize is "[t]o make into, or like, a demon; to render
demoniacal; to represent as a demon." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, Oxford
University Press, http://www.oed.com.ezaccess.libraries.psu.edu/view/Entry/49820?
redirectedFrom=demonize (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. This is the thesis of Professor Dan M. Kahan. See infra notes 177-78 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Dan M. Kahan, "Ideology in " or "Cultural
Cognition of 'Judging: What Difference Does It Make? 92 MARQ. L. REV. 143 (2009).
8. Id.
9. See infra Part III.D.
10. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974).
11. On the question of the extent to which Pennsylvania administrative law applies
to the Department of Corrections, see infra Parts II.C. and III.D.
12. Bums v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 2008). On remand, the
district court held that although "[t]he Third Circuit has determined that [Bums] has a
right to security in his inmate account," with "limited due process protections," Bums
was entitled only to declarative relief. 2009 WL 1475274, at *17 (E.D. Pa. May 26,
2009). On a second appeal, the Third Circuit again affirmed Bums's new property right.
Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (3d Cir. 2011). However, it ruled that
because Bums's due-process rights were violated at the prison disciplinary hearing, the
sanctions imposed must be expunged from the record. The Third Circuit underscored the
novelty of the property right-"a new twist"-by finding that prison officials could not
have been expected to be aware of it. Id. at 178-79.
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The background section continues with a discussion of cases that
illustrate judicial deference toward prison administrators. Two kinds of
deference emerge. First, courts defer substantively in construing statutes
or prison policies whenever they regard prison as a strange context where
Second, courts defer procedurally when they
they lack expertise.
simply decline to review the outcome of a prison grievance or
disciplinary action. 14 However, constitutional concerns may trump
5
deference to prison administrators where due process rights are at stake.'
An analysis follows the background. The analytic section proposes
that empathy theory can explain both the courts' general tendency to
defer substantively to prison administrators and the departure from that
tendency in Burns. Empathy, as the manner in which human beings
grasp the perceptions and follow the decision processes of others, has
been the subject of recent philosophical and legal scholarship.16 The
jurisprudence of empathy provides the lens through which to examine
three instances of substantive deference." In each case, the prisonerplaintiffs experience remained opaque to the court. This failure of
insight, which inhibited understanding of the prisoner's perspective,
betrayed itself through harshly negative descriptions of the prisoners in
By contrast, demonization was entirely absent
the courts' opinions.
when a court achieved empathic access to the prisoner's predicament
through something already familiar: the relationship between a debtor
and a judgment creditor.' 9 Hence the court announced the new property
right in Burns.20
The analysis concludes with discussion of the practical import of
the surprising Burns decision for prisons within the Third Circuit. Any
proceeding in which a prisoner is found to be financially responsible for
13. For example, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a Wisconsin
prisoner's challenge to a ban on a role-playing game because the court credited the
affidavit of a single prison employee unsupported by evidence. Singer v. Raemisch, 593
F.3d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 2010). See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
14. For example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the Commonwealth
Court has no jurisdiction over decisions on disciplinary matters by the Department of
Corrections. Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. 1998).
See infra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
15. For example, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court held that a prison cannot
take money out of an inmate account without notice, a hearing with transcript and
opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses, and a written decision. Holloway v.
Lehman, 671 A.2d 1179, 1182 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 504, 505, 507 (West 2008).
16. The theories of Dan M. Kahan, Edith Stein, and Darrell A.H. Miller inform the
analysis. See infra notes 176-85 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part II.B.
19. Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2008).
20. Id. at 291.
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harm stemming from an infraction now must be judicially reviewable.21
Conversely, in jurisdictions like Pennsylvania where courts routinely
decline to review prison disciplinary hearings, a hearing officer at such
an unreviewable hearing no longer can assess a prisoner's account for
12
The practical implications of
costs incurred because of an offense.
Burns have not immediately affected prison litigation.2 3 The theoretical
and explanatory value of the case for a jurisprudence of empathy may be
greater than its practical impact.
II.

BACKGROUND

Several landmark cases define the contours of due process rights for
prisoners. Constitutional rights are limited in society and especially in
prison by the interests of the government. Special limitations for
prisoners arise when courts defer to prison administrators. 24 Two kinds
First, courts defer
of judicial deference can be distinguished.25
substantively to the judgments of prison administrators in construing
statutes and in other determinations on the premise that prison is a unique
context requiring special expertise that only the administrators have. 26
Second, courts defer procedurally by relaxing due process requirements
or by declining to review prison disciplinary proceedings entirely.27 One
exception to the trend of procedural deference may arise when a
disciplinary board proposes to assess costs against a prisoner's account
28
for an infraction committed during incarceration.
A.

ConstitutionalRights Not Absolute

Constitutional protections for property rights arise from the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments. 2 9 The protections of the United States
Constitution extend to prisoners. 30 "The Court has consistently held that
21. See infra Part Ill.D.
22. See infra Part III.D.
23. See infra Part III.D.3.
24. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974).
25. See infra Parts II.B and II.C.
26. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995).
27. See, e.g., Portalatin v. Dept. of Corr., 979 A.2d 944, 948 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)
(citing Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998)).
28. See infra Part III.C for discussion of Bums v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 544
F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2008).
29. "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. "[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. .. ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30. "Prisoners may also claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. They may
not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." Wolff v.
McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). The Wolffcourt famously remarked, "There is no
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some kind of hearing is required at some time before a person is finally
deprived of his property interests." 3 1 However, due-process rights are
not absolute for anyone. The extent of due-process rights depends on the
situation. 32 The Court in Mathews v. Eldridge33 summarized the Court's
earlier due-process jurisprudence into three factors:
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process generally
requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private
interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest,
including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
would entail.34
These circumstantial considerations limit the due-process rights of all
persons, including prisoners. Using the Mathews test, the Court weighs
the government's interest against the individual's interest and the
likelihood of significantly reducing the risk of infringement by imposing
a hearing requirement.3 5
Besides the Mathews factors, which may limit due process rights in
any given situation, the special situation of imprisonment brings
additional curtailment of Constitutional rights. The Court in Wolff v.
McDonnell37 held that "there must be mutual accommodation between
institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution
that are of general application."" That accommodation must balance the

iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country." Id. at 55556.
31. Id. at 558.
32. "'(D)ue process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citing Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 335.
35. Id. at 334-35.
36. "[T]he fact that prisoners retain rights under the Due Process Clause in no way
implies that these rights are not subject to restrictions imposed by the nature of the
regime to which they have been lawfully committed." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S.
539, 556 (1974).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 556. Wolff s protection of prisoners' liberty interests was later reduced by
Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995) (finding no liberty interest against a range of
conditions deemed to be the normal incidents of incarceration, such as disciplinary
segregation).
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prison's interests against those of the prisoner.39 Four "factors are
relevant in determining the reasonableness" of a prison regulation. 40 The
court first asks whether there is "a 'valid, rational connection' between
the prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it."4 1 The purpose of the regulation must not be
arbitrary: "the governmental objective must be a legitimate and neutral
one." 42 Second, the court asks whether prisoners have "alternative
means" to exercise the restricted right.43 Third, the court considers the
possibility of a "ripple effect," that is, whether "accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will [negatively affect] guards and other
inmates[] and ... the allocation of prison resources." 44 Fourth, the court
finds "evidence of . .. reasonableness" of a regulation in "the absence of
ready alternatives" to accomplish the stated goals of the challenged
regulation.4 5
Hence, the Turner reasonableness standard for curtailing
constitutional rights of prisoners rests on four factors: (1) a rational,
non-arbitrary connection between the regulation and a valid prison
interest; (2) availability of alternative means for inmates to exercise the
infringed right; (3) the likelihood of a harmful "ripple effect" without the
regulation; and (4) the lack of a viable alternative way for the prison to
achieve its stated purpose.46
In prison, as elsewhere, a hearing is generally required before
property can be taken by the state because an opportunity to challenge
deductions from a prisoner's account is essential to due process.47 Under
some circumstances, however, federal courts have held that the
opportunity to challenge need not precede the event that deprived the
plaintiff of property. 48 The availability of a post-deprivation remedy may
39. "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests." Turner
v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
40. Id.
41. Id. (citing Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 586 (1984)).
42. Id. at 90.
43. Id.
44. Id.

45. Id.
46. Turner remains good law, although subsequent decisions appear to place greater
weight on the first factor. See infra Part III.D.
47. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974). See infra Part II.C. for the sorts
of deductions that prisons, acting in the role of banker, may take from prisoners'
accounts.
48. The availability of a later remedy through a state tort action afforded sufficient
process when negligent handling of mail delivery deprived a Nebraska prisoner of hobby
materials. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986). Similarly, intentional destruction of a Virginia
prisoner's property by a guard during a cell search did not violate due process, inasmuch
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be sufficient to satisfy due process requirements for prisoners, according
to the Parratt-Hudsondoctrine.49 Hudson v. Palmer50 held that "an
unauthorized intentional deprivation of property by a state employee
does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available." 5 ' However, the ParrattHudson doctrine may not apply when regular deductions occur in
accordance with an established administrative code or policy. 52 The
doctrine pertains only to unpredictable takings of property when the
taking has occurred through "random and unauthorized intentional
conduct of [state] employees" or through "negligent conduct" that could
not be anticipated.53 When the state takes funds from inmate accounts
under terms of an established policy, courts usually require that policy to
provide for pre-deprivation hearings.5 4
B.

Substantive Deference

Federal courts generally defer to state prison administrators when
called upon to review correctional practices that may have some bearing
upon the constitutional rights of prisoners, for example, rights protected
by the First Amendment.5 5 "[F]ederal courts ought to afford appropriate
deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a volatile

as the prisoner had access to post-deprivation remedies under state law, and because
prisoners in his position generally may resort to grievance procedures and state tort
actions. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 534-36, 536 n.15 (1984).
49. See Brown v. Crowley, No. 99-2216229, 2000 WL 1175615, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug
10, 2000) (finding sufficient process when a Michigan prisoner could have sued in state
court after funds were wrongfully taken from his account); Gallagher v. Lane, 75 F.
App'x 440, (6th Cir. 2003) (dismissing an Ohio prisoner's due-process claim in part
because he did not allege inadequacy of post-deprivation remedies for wrongful
deductions from his account). Cf Wright v. Riveland, 219 F.3d 905, 918 (9th Cir. 2000)
(remanding for trial of a Washington inmate's Eighth Amendment claim that excessive
deductions had been taken).
50. Hudson, 468 U.S. 517.
51. Id.at533.
52. See, e.g., Gillihan v. Shillinger, 872 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1989) (distinguishing the
unpredictability of the property deprivations in Parratt and Hudson from the routine
practice of charging a prisoner for transport without notification or a hearing). Cf
Mahers v. Halford, 76 F.3d 951 (8th Cir. 1996) (approving deductions from funds
received as a gift by an Iowa prisoner in light of statutory provision for judicial review of
the deduction plan upon request).
53. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533.
54. See, e.g., Gillihan, 872 F.2d 935.
55. Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482-83 (1995).
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environment."56 Deference to prisons often surfaces when a court
undertakes a Turner analysis of a constitutional claim. 57
1.

Youngsters as Visitors

In Overton v. Bazetta,5 8 Michelle Bazzetta and several other women
prisoners asserted First Amendment rights to challenge Michigan prison
regulations that restricted visits by babies and children. 5 9 The rules
banned minor nieces and nephews from the visiting room and excluded
prisoners' own sons and daughters if parental rights had been
terminated.6 0 In the Court's highly deferential analysis, the first Turner
factor weighed in favor of the prison policy because "the regulations bear
a rational relation to [the prison's] valid interests in maintaining internal
security and protecting child visitors from exposure to sexual or other
misconduct or from accidental injury."61 The restrictions on child
visitors also had the effect of "limiting the disruption caused by
The court found these to be legitimate penological
children." 62

interests. 63
The three other Turner factors considered in the Court's strained
analysis were found to support the prison's position as well.64 The Court
suggested that the women prisoners had alternate means to communicate
with the banned babies and toddlers because the women could pass
messages to them through approved visitors or could phone or write to
the children.65 The Court saw a negative impact on the prison should the
banned children be allowed to visit.6 6 It reasoned that providing
adequate supervision of the visiting room would financially drain the
56. Id.
57. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987). See also the cases under
discussion in this section: Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003); Beard v. Banks, 548
U.S. 521 (2006); Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010).
58. Overton, 539 U.S. 126.
59. Id The First Amendment protects freedom of association. U.S. CoNST. amend.
1. The Court agreed that "certain kinds of highly personal relationships" are
constitutionally protected. Overton, 539 U.S. at 131 (citing Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-20 (1984)). That protection avails "outside the prison
context" but "[t]he very object of imprisonment is confinement. Many of the liberties
and privileges enjoyed by other citizens must be surrendered by the prisoner. An inmate
does not retain rights inconsistent with proper incarceration." Id. Ms. Bazetta challenged
several other visitor restrictions besides the ban on children who were not of the
immediate family.
60. Overton, 539 U.S. at 129-30.
61. Id. at 133.
62. Id
63. Id
64. Id. at 135.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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prison and make it difficult to maintain secure conditions in other areas
of the institution.6 7 Finally, the Court found that the prisoners had
suggested no alternative way for the prison to achieve its goals if it lifted
the ban on certain children. 68 The Court remarked, "The burden ... is
not on the State to prove the validity of prison regulations but on the
prisoner to disprove it." 69
In Overton, the majority offered no explicit rationale for deference
to the prison administration beyond the four-factor Turner analysis." A
concurrence by Justice Thomas, in which Justice Scalia joined, suggests
7
Thomas opined that states have
a more troubling line of reasoning.n
leeway to design punishment in any manner they choose, subject to the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.72 This is so, he reasoned, because the United States
Constitution has no "implicit definition of incarceration." 73 The prison
sentence imposed by a state implicitly includes all the particular
regulations that the state's corrections department may enact, and the
regulations are presumed to pass muster on the Turner criteria, unless
successfully challenged in court.7 The concurrence went on to speculate
that Michigan, acting within its prerogatives, rightfully had designed its
mode of incarceration in the tradition of nineteenth century prisons,
when visiting practices were conceived to be part of the punishment.75
On that rationale, Justice Thomas joined in the deferential holding
approving Michigan's ban on visits from children whose kinship to the
prisoner happened to fall outside categories narrowly defined by the
state.

67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 131.
70. Id. at 135.
71. Id. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring).
72. Id. "States are free to define and redefine all types of punishment, including
imprisonment, to encompass various types of deprivations-provided only that those
deprivations are consistent with the Eighth Amendment." Id. (emphasis in original).
73. Overton, 539 U.S. at 139.
74. Id. at 142 (Thomas, J., concurring). "Restrictions that are rationally connected to
the running of a prison, that are designed to avoid adverse impacts on guards, inmates, or
prison resources, that cannot be replaced by 'ready alternatives', and that leave inmates
with alternative means of accomplishing what the restrictions prohibit, are presumptively
included within a sentence of imprisonment." Id
75. Id. at 144 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("[In the nineteenth century, m]any prisons
offered tours in order to increase revenues. During such tours, visitors could freely stare
at prisoners, while prisoners had to obey regulations categorically forbidding them to so
much as look at a visitor."). The intent and effect of this practice, Justice Thomas
remarked, was to use visitors to humiliate prisoners as part of their punishment. Id.
"Michigan sentenced respondents against the backdrop of this conception of
imprisonment." Id. at 144-45.
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Media in the LTSU

In another case involving substantive deference, Ronald Banks
failed in a First Amendment class action to overturn a Pennsylvania
prison ban on books, newspapers, and photographs within a restrictive
housing unit.76 The plurality in Beard v. Banks77 applied a four-step
Turner analysis to a policy that deprived "specially dangerous and
recalcitrant inmates" of reading materials until they "graduate[d]" to a
less restrictive level of confinement.78 First, the Court found a valid
prison interest in that the deprivation of reading material could motivate
the prisoner to change his behavior. 7 9 The second Turner factor,
however, weighed in favor of the prisoners. Although about one quarter
of inmates subjected to the no-book regime did "graduate" to the less
restrictive level within ninety days, the others had "no alternative means
of exercising the right" of free expression under the First Amendment.80
Nevertheless, this factor was not decisive.81 The Court went on to
dispense with the third Turner factor in a single sentence, using circular
reasoning to infer a likely negative impact. 82 Without the book ban, the
Court speculated, the opposite of the good effect intended by motivation
(Turner factor one) would result: lack of motivation, continued bad
behavior, longer stays in restrictive housing, and consequent increased
costs for the prison.83 The plurality found that it could not apply the
fourth Turner factor because the prisoners had suggested no less
restrictive way to achieve the motivational intent claimed by the prison.84
Thus, the Court found that the second, third, and fourth Turner factors in
this case boiled down to the first because they were "logically related" to
its rationale. Nevertheless, "[t]he real task in this case is not balancing
these factors, but rather determining whether the Secretary shows more
than simply a logical relation, that is, whether he shows a reasonable
76. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 525-26.
79. The plurality found that the state "set forth several justifications for the prison's
policy, including the need to motivate better behavior on the part of particularly difficult
prisoners. . . . We need go no further than the first justification, that of providing
increased incentives for better prison behavior." Id. at 530.
80. Id. at 532 (emphasis and internal citation omitted).
81. Id. "The absence of any alternative thus provides 'some evidence that the
regulations [a]re unreasonable', but is not 'conclusive' of the reasonableness of the
Policy." Id. (citing Overton v. Bazetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (2003)).
82. Banks, 548 U.S. at 532.
83. Id ("If the Policy (in the authorities' view) helps to produce better behavior,
then its absence (in the authorities' view) will help to produce worse behavior, e.g.,
'backsliding' (and thus the expenditure of more 'resources."').).
84. Id.
85. Id.
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relation." 86 The plurality concluded that the book-banning policy was
reasonable." With Banks, the Court may have reached the apex of its
substantive deference to prison administrations.
Justice Thomas wrote a concurring opinion that shed light on the
Court's deferential stance. 89 He cited and amplified his Overton
concurrence in an argument against the propriety of the Turner analysis
itself where deprivation of privileges is at issue. 90 Deprivation as a
behavior modification technique is "necessary" for the management of
prisoners.91
Justice Thomas reasoned that "this legal conclusion,
combined with the deference to the judgment of prison officials required
under Turner[,] ... would entitle prison officials to summary judgment
against challenges to their inmate prison deprivation policies in virtually
every case." 9 2 Therefore, any "[j]udicial scrutiny of prison regulations is
an endeavor fraught with peril."93
These extreme statements of substantive deference, along with the
plurality opinion, evoked rigorous criticism from Justice Stevens in a
dissenting opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg. 9 4 The dissent pointed out
that reliance upon the sheer utility of behavior modification through
deprivation, without limits, was "perilously close to a state-sponsored
effort at mind control." 95 Rehabilitation, including the modification of
behavior, is a "valid penological interest," 96 but it lacks an internal
limiting principle. 9 7 In effect, the Stevens dissent warned that the Court
appeared to authorize prisons to deprive inmates of any and all
constitutional rights under the pretext of rehabilitation through behavior
modification.

86. Id. at 533.
87. Id.
88. Several scholars have argued that Banks marks the demise of the fourfold Turner
test for permissible infringement of constitutional rights by prisons. See infra Part Ill.D.
89. Justice Scalia joined the Thomas concurrence, as he had done in Overton.
Banks, 548 U.S. at 536-42 (Thomas, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 540.
91. Id. (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 134 (2003)).
92. Banks, 548 U.S. at 540 n.2 (internal citation omitted).
93. Id at 535.
94. Id. at 542-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 552.
96. Id. at 548. However, the dissent remarked that the state "did not introduce
evidence that [its] proposed theory of behavior modification has any basis in human
psychology, or that the challenged rule has in fact had any rehabilitative effect on LTSU2 inmates." Id. at 550.
97. Id. at 546 ("Any deprivation of something a prisoner desires gives him an added
incentive to improve his behavior. This justification has no limiting principle [and would
support] any regulation that deprives a prisoner of a constitutional right so long as there is
at least a theoretical possibility that the prisoner can regain the right at some future time
by modifying his behavior.").
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Dungeons and Dragons

The Supreme Court's substantive deference to prison
administrators, exemplified in Overton and Banks, is reflected in a
subsequent decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, Singer v. Raemisch.98 Kevin Singer was a lifelong fan
of the fantasy role-playing game Dungeons and Dragons (D&D). 99 Even
after he was incarcerated at Wisconsin's Waupin Correctional Institution,
Singer maintained his interest with an extensive collection of D&Drelated comic books, and he authored a ninety-six-page scenario for the
game.100 But in November 2004, the prison instituted a policy banning
D&D and confiscated Singer's collection.o'0 When he brought suit in
federal court on First Amendment grounds, the Seventh Circuit applied a
Turner analysis to Singer's appeal and affirmed summary judgment in
favor of the state.102 As in Overton and Banks, the court in Singer v.
Raemischl0 3 paid most attention to the first Turner factor: to establish a
rational, non-arbitrary connection between the regulation banning D&D
materials and a valid prison interest.10 4 While purporting to review the
summary judgment de novo and to "construe all facts and reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmoving party,"' 0 5 the court nevertheless
accepted the prison's assertion that D&D was a gang-related game
despite affidavits from numerous prisoners that D&D was an innocent
alternative to gangs.' 0 6 This result rested on a distinction between plain
The prison's gang
facts and facts of "professional judgment."' 07
specialist testified that "co-operative games can mimic the organization
of gangs and lead to the actual development thereof' and "can 'foster an
inmate's obsession with escaping from the real life, correctional
environment."" 0 8 This expert testimony was enough to tip Turner factor
one in favor of the state.109 On factor two, the court found that "Singer

98. Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529, 532 (7th Cir. 2010).
99. Id.
100. Id. at 531-32.
101. Id. at 531.
102. Id. at534-40.
103. Id. at 529.
104. Id. at531.
105. Id. at 533.
106. Id. at 533-34.
107. Id. at 534 ("[W]e must distinguish between inferences relating to disputed facts
and those relating to disputed matters of professional judgment.").
108. Id. at 535.
109. Id. at 536 ("The question is not whether D & D has led to gang behavior in the
past [but] whether the prison officials are rational in their belief that, if left unchecked, D
& D could lead to gang behavior among inmates and undermine prison security in the
future.").
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still has access to other allowable games, reading material, and leisure
activities."1" 0 On factor three, the court predicted a negative impact on
the entire prison should an exception to the D&D ban be made for
Singer."' On factor four, Singer apparently put forth the self-defeating
argument that the prison's alternative to D&D would be actual gang
activity, which already was banned under pre-existing policy." 2 The
court concluded, after weighing the Turner factors, that the prison had
demonstrated a rational relation of its D&D ban to a genuine state
interest.' 13
The rationale of the Singer decision arguably intended the sort of
"mind control" that Justice Stevens decried in his Banks dissent. Prison
administrators conjectured that access to D&D materials would assist
prisoners to imagine, for a time, that they were not incarcerated.11 4
Dangerous imagination,"' dangerous newspapers," 6 and dangerous
toddlers in the visiting room, 17 all strain the limits of common-sense
notions of what can be deemed non-arbitrary limitations of constitutional
rights under Turner factor one. These cases typify an inclination to defer
to prison administrators on the substance of constitutional claims.
C.

ProceduralDeference

Prison process for taking the property of prisoners also typically
receives deferential review from courts, if reviewed at all under the
Fourteenth or the Fifth Amendments." 8 Deduction of funds from
prisoner accounts may occur pursuant to a statute or an administrative
policy. Statutes may empower a court to impose a fine or restitution as a
component of sentencing or to order payments for indebtedness for child
support or litigation filing fees." 9 Administrative policies may empower
a prison disciplinary board to impose costs as part of a punishment for an
110. Id at 539.
111. Id. at 539 ("[I]t is clear that accommodating Singer's or another inmate's request
for an exception to the D & D ban could have significant detrimental effects to inmates
and guards alike.").
112. Id.
113. Id. at 540 ("[Singer] has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact
concerning the reasonableness of the relationship between Waupun's D & D ban and the
prison's clearly legitimate penological interests.").
114. Id. at 535.
115. Id.
116. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
117. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003).
118. See, e.g., Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., Ky., 501 F.3d. 726 (6th Cir. 2007). Sickles
is discussed infra Part C.L
119. For example, if a prisoner has filed a federal lawsuit in forma pauperis, the
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 requires monthly deductions of 20 percent of his
income to cover deferred filing fees. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(b)(2) (2006).
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infraction committed during incarceration.120 Between the assessment of
the cost and the actual taking of the funds, an issue of due process arises.
A prisoner may seek to challenge either the correctness of the assessment
itself or the calculated rate at which deductions are to be made from his
account to pay down the amount assessed. 12 1 Such a challenge typically
meets procedural roadblocks in federal court.12 2 State courts simply may
However, in
decline to review prison disciplinary hearings. 123
Pennsylvania, a prison must conduct a separate, judicially reviewable
adjudication before depriving a prisoner of funds for a disciplinary
infraction. 124
1.

Little or No Process Under Mathews

The Sixth Circuit used the Mathews balancing test as a procedural
impediment in Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., Ky., when a county prisoner in
Kentucky argued that he should have had a hearing before the jail took
his funds to cover the costs of his booking and incarceration. 125 The
court balanced inmate Sickles' property interest in the 20 dollars that the
jail had taken against the jail's interest in recouping incarceration costs,
all in light of the minimal likelihood of an accounting error and the
availability of a post-deprivation grievance procedure should an error be
detected. 126 The court said that Mr. Sickles was "barking up the wrong
tree" if he expected to delay the confiscation of his funds until after he
had a hearing.127
A state prisoner met a similar procedural roadblock in the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court when he challenged how deductions were
made to cover the $10,000 restitution, fine, and costs that the sentencing
court had ordered him to pay.12 8 By statute, "the Department of
Corrections shall be authorized to make monetary deductions from
inmate personal accounts for the purpose of collecting restitution or any
120. For example, Pennsylvania's Inmate Discipline Procedures Manual provides that
a hearing officer may assess costs against a prisoner. Pa. Dep't of Corr., Inmate
Discipline Procedures Manual, DC-ADM 801 § 8(A)(3) (2008) [hereinafter DC-ADM
801], available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/department
of corrections/4604/docpolicies/ (last visited on Dec. 18, 2011).
121. See, e.g., Buck v. Beard, 583 Pa. 431 (Pa. 2005). Buck is discussed infra Part
C. 1.
122. See, e.g., Sickles, 501 F.3d 726.
123. See, e.g., Portalatin v. Dept. of Corr., 979 A.2d 944, 948 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009)
(citing Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998)).
124. DC-ADM 801, supra note 120, at § 8(C).
125. Sickles, 501 F.3d at 730-32. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35
(1976).
126. Sickles, 501 F.3d at 730-31.
127. Id. at 731.
128. Buck v. Beard, 583 Pa. 431 (Pa. 2005).
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other court-ordered obligation."' 29 The Department chose to make
monthly deductions of 20 percent of the balance in the prisoner's
account. 130 The prisoner, Darryl Buck, claimed he was entitled to a
hearing before deductions could be made, and the court defined the issue
as "whether due process requires a specific judicial determination of
ability to pay before the Department may deduct payments for fines,
costs, or restitution."
The court answered in the negative. 132 First, it found that the
sentencing hearing already had afforded Mr. Buck an opportunity to
present evidence of his ability to pay.133 Next, the court conducted a
Mathews-style analysis without citing Mathews.13 4 It balanced the cost
and inconvenience of another hearing against the negligible need to
determine whether Mr. Buck was able to pay.' 3 5 "Corrections officials
know the amount of money in a prisoner's account. They also know that
he will be provided with life's necessities.

. .

. There is little to be gained

by holding a hearing to confirm matters that are already known."' 36 Like
the Sixth Circuit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court deferred to prison
procedures by declining to require an additional hearing before courtordered payments could be deducted from a prisoner's account.' 37
2.

No Judicial Review Under Bronson

Pennsylvania courts decline to review disciplinary hearings for
infractions alleged during incarceration." 8 In Bronson v. Central Office
Review Committee,'39 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that the
Commonwealth Court has neither original nor appellate jurisdiction over
decisions on disciplinary matters by the highest level of review within
the Department of Corrections, the Central Office Review Committee

42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9728(b)(5) (2007).
130. Buck, 583 Pa. at 433. The opinion does not specify that the deductions were
monthly, but the statute is implemented through a policy that specifies monthly
deductions of 20 percent. See Pa. Dep't of Corr., Collection of Inmate Debts, DC-ADM
005 (2007), available at http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/
department of corrections/4604/docpolicies/ (last visited on Dec. 30, 2010).
131. Buck, 583 Pa. at 436.
132. Id. at 436-37.
133. Id. at 436.
134. Id. at 436-27. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
135. Buck, 583 Pa. at 436-37.
136. Id. at 437.
137. Sickles v. Campbell Cnty., Ky. 501 F.3d 726, 730-32 (6th Cir. 2007); Buck, 583
Pa. at 437.
138. Prison discipline is governed by the Inmate Discipline ProceduresManual, DCADM 801, supra note 120.
139. Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357 (Pa. 1998).
129.
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(C.O.R.C.).1 40 The court held that the C.O.R.C. "does not function on
the level of a government agency" but handles only matters "internal to
the Department of Corrections."l 4 1 This finding exempted C.O.R.C.
from the state constitutional requirement that "[t]here shall be a right of
appeal in all cases . . . from an administrative agency to a court of record

or to an appellate court." 4 2 The Bronson court went on to explain that
"prison officials must be allowed to exercise their judgment in the
execution of policies necessary to preserve order and maintain security
free from judicial interference." 4 3 An exception to this deferential
policy occurs if a significant constitutional right is in question, but the
court found that the right of inmate Bronson to possess civilian clothing
while in prison did not rise to the level of a protected constitutional
right. 144
The Bronson court's narrow construction of prisoners'
constitutional rights led to a dismissal of another inmate's appeal against
medical co-pay charges to his account.14 5 Prisoner Portalatin pursued the
grievance process to a final denial by the C.O.R.C. after he objected to
In
charges for medical treatment of a chronic skin condition. 14
Portalatinv. Department of Corrections,147 the court declined to review
the determination of the Department of Corrections that the charges
conformed to the applicable statute and policy.14 8 Citing Bronson, the
court said that it "[did] not have appellate jurisdiction over inmate
appeals of decisions by intra-prison disciplinary tribunals, such as
140. Id. at 359.
141. Id. at 358.
142. PA. CONST. art. V, § 9. Likewise, the C.O.R.C. is exempted from 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 763 (West 2004), which provides for appeal of final orders of agencies to
the Commonwealth Court.
143. Bronson, 721 A.2d at 358.
144. Id. at 359-60. See also Iseley v. Beard, 841 A.2d 168, 174 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
2004) (finding that the prisoner's constitutional claim was outweighed by the prison's
interest in depriving him of reading material as "a non-violent form of behavior
modification used to teach inmates to follow basic orders and behave in a safe and
acceptable way"). The Iseley court also cited the Bronson principle that courts simply do
not review prison disciplinary proceedings. Id. at 172.
145. Portalatin v. Dep't of Corr., 979 A.2d 944 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).
146. Id. at 946.
147. Portalatin, 979 A.2d 944.
148. Prisoners are responsible for some of the costs of their medical treatment under
the Prison Medical Services Act, 61 P.S. §§ 1011-17 (1999). The Department of
Corrections implemented the Act through a policy that exempted some chronic
conditions from co-pays. Portalatin,979 A.2d at 950 (citing Pa. Dep't of Corr., CoPayment for Medical Services, DC-ADM 820, V(A)(1)a). The exclusive list of chronic
diseases no longer appears in an updated version the policy. See Pa. Dep't of Corr., CoPayment for Medical Services, DC-ADM 820 § 1(B)(7 & 16) (2009), available at
http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/department-of corrections/460
4/docjolicies/ (last visited on Dec. 18, 2011).
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Although a constitutional
grievance and misconduct appeals." 4 9
violation might merit review, the court found that Mr. Portalatin had no
constitutional right to free medical care, nor was any other constitutional
right infringed.so
In part because of its procedural deference to the Department of
Corrections (DOC), the Portalatincourt did not directly address one of
the plaintiffs most astute arguments:
Portalatin counters that DOC's decision to assess him a fee for the
treatment of his skin disorder constitutes an "adjudication" under the
Administrative Agency Law. That act defines an "adjudication" as
"[a]ny final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by an
agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities,
duties, liabilities or obligations of any or all of the parties to the
proceeding in which the adjudication is made."151
This argument simply was mooted by reference to authorities stating that
the C.O.R.C. is not an agency.152
3.

A Reviewable Hearing Under Holloway

Nevertheless, in another line of cases the Commonwealth Court
held that a final decision to deprive a prisoner of property could indeed
be an "adjudication" within the meaning of Pennsylvania's
Administrative Agency Law.153 "[I]f an inmate can identify a personal or
property interest which is not limited by Department regulations and
which is affected by a final decision of the Department, the Department's
decision in those circumstances may constitute an adjudication subject to
our appellate review."'l54 A 1995 pro se action by prisoner Deron
Holloway satisfied that condition.' 5 5

149. Portalatin,979 A.2d at 948 (citing Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721
A.2d 357, 358-59 (Pa. 1998)).
150. Id at 949.
151. Id. at 948 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). See Administrative
Agency Law, 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 101, 501-08, 701-04 (West 2008).
152. The Portalatin court relied on Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721
A.2d 357, 358 (Pa. 1998). See supra notes 139-44 and accompanying text.
153. An adjudication is "[a]ny final order, decree, decision, determination or ruling by
an agency affecting personal or property rights, privileges, immunities, duties, liabilities
or obligations of any or all of the parties to the proceeding in which the adjudication is
made." 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West 2008). See, e.g., Holloway v. Lehman, 671
A.2d 1179, 1180 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996).
154. Lawson v. Commonwealth, 538 A.2d 69, 71 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("[T]he
Department's decision [revoking pre-release status for misconduct] is not an adjudication
subject to our appellate review [only] because it does not implicate any rights or
privileges not limited by Department regulations.").
155. Holloway, 671 A.2d 1179.

PENN STATE LAw REVIEW

1226

[Vol. 116:4

After a disciplinary hearing, Holloway was found responsible for
"Thereafter, without any further
destroying prison property.156
opportunity for a hearing, the monetary amount of the damage ... was
administratively calculated and the business office of the [prison]
directed that money be deducted from [Holloway's] prison account to
pay the damages."" 7 Holloway did not challenge the finding of
misconduct but only the manner in which money was subsequently taken
from his account, that is, with "no opportunity to challenge the amount of
the assessment."' 58
The court reasoned that "[i]t is beyond dispute that money is
property. Private property cannot be taken by the government without
due process."l 59 The court looked to Pennsylvania administrative law to
determine the nature of the process required for such an adjudication.16 0
It held that nonconsensual deductions from an inmate's account required
notice and a hearing.161 Moreover,
[t]he inmate must be given an opportunity to be heard, all testimony
must be recorded, and a full and complete record of the proceedings
must be kept. Reasonable examination and cross-examination must
be allowed. The adjudication must be in writing and contain findings
of fact and reasons for the decision.162
The formal hearing contemplated by the court would issue an
adjudication to take funds from a prisoner account, and that adjudication
would be subject to judicial review. 6 3 Thus, what came to be known as
a "Holloway hearing" constitutes a narrow but significant exception to
the procedural deference typically shown to prison administrators by
Pennsylvania courts.' 64
III. ANALYSIS
This section examines judicial deference to the managerial
decisions of prison administrators. The intent is to explain both why
156. Id. at 1180.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1181.
159. Id. (internal citations omitted).
160. Id See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 504 (West 2008).
161. Holloway, 671 A.2d at 1181. See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 504 (West 2008).
162. Holloway, 671 A.2d at 1182 (internal citations omitted). See 2 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. §§ 504, 505, 507 (West 2008).
163. Holloway, 671 A.2d at 1182. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763 (West 2004).
164. Two hearings are required before the prison can deduct funds for damage done
by a prisoner. First, he must be found responsible in a misconduct hearing that is
appealable to the Chief Hearing Examiner but is not judicially reviewable. DC-ADM
801, supra note 120, at §§ 3 and 5. Then, if notified that the prison proposes to assess
costs against his account, the inmate may request a formal hearing. Id. at § 8(B).

2012]1

EMPATHY

1227

such deference is the norm and why the Third Circuit departed from that
norm when it declared a hitherto unrecognized property right for
prisoners in Burns v. Pa. Dep 't of Corr.'65 The interpretive lens
employed here is borrowed from the discipline of philosophical
hermeneutics, particularly from the work of Edith Stein. 66 Although the
167
term "empathy" has fallen into disrepute in recent political rhetoric, it
is a central analytical term in contemporary theories of understanding.168
Empathy (or Einfiihlung in German) is the manner in which human
beings grasp the experiences of others, and the term covers intellectual as
Judicial deference to prison
well as emotional understanding.' 6 9
administrators predominates in opinions that depict the prison
environment as alien, so different from the world of the Court that its
logic is opaque.' 70 By contrast, the Burns court readily analogized the
infringement of the prisoner's account funds to the familiar, transparent
relations of debtor and creditor.' 7 ' The anomalous result in Burns,
reached in an uncharacteristically empathetic flash of insight into prison
life, requires a reassessment of administrative procedures for disciplinary
actions that contemplate the taking of prisoner funds.1 72
A.

Empathy as a Principleof Understanding

As a senator, Barack Obama voted against the nomination of John
G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief Justice of the United States because he found
Later, when President Obama
Mr. Roberts to lack empathy. 73
States Supreme Court, he
United
the
to
Sotomayor
Sonia
nominated
judges should also be
law,
of
insisted "that while adhering to the rule
able to see life through the eyes of those who come before the bench."' 74

165. Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2008).
166. Edith Stein (1891-1942) was a philosopher and participant in the
Phenomenological Movement. SARAH R. BORDEN, EDITH STEIN (2004).
167. Opposition to the nomination of Sonia Sotomayor to the United States Supreme
Court focused in part on the term "empathy," used by President Obama to describe a
capacity that he considered essential for a Justice. See the critical remarks of Sens. Jon
Kyl and Tom Coburn during Senate debate over the Sotomayor nomination, 155 CONG.
REC. S8818-25 (daily ed. Aug. 5,2009).
168. For a discussion of the hermeneutical tradition in philosophy and a survey of its
recent history, see MARIANNE SAWICKI, BODY, TEXT, AND SCIENCE: THE LITERACY OF
INVESTIGATIVE PRACTICES AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF EDITH STEIN 3-43 (1997).

169. Id at 145.
170. See infra Part III.B. for a discussion of three cases where the court displays a
lack of empathy.
171. See infra Part III.C.
172. See infra Part III.D.
173. Peter Baker, In Searchfor New Justice, Empathy, or at Least "Empathy, " Is Out,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A12.

174. Id.
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Equating tough court decisions to a marathon, Mr. Obama said that
the first 25 miles may be determined by precedent and technical
understanding of the law, but "that last mile can only be determined
on the basis of one's deepest values, one's core concerns, one's
broader perspectives on how the world works, and the depth and
breadth of one's empathy."175
Judges approach cases pre-equipped with "certain models in their
heads . . . which have been idiosyncratically ingrained by genes, culture,
education, parents and events. These models shape the way judges
perceive the world."1 76 Professor Dan M. Kahan has suggested that
differences of experience, rather than ideological differences, account for
many disagreements among Justices of the Supreme Court.177 Values
always shape the perception of facts.178
Differences of values and experiences, however, need not impede
understanding. Empathy is the definitively human capacity to grasp the
experiences of another person: not to live through them in the original
way that the other lives them, but rather in a shared, communicated
manner. 179 Human beings are intrinsically receptive to understanding the
experience of another human, although some people are more open to

175. Id The President's remarks were controversial, and Senator Coburn criticized
them in his opposition to the Sotomayor nomination: "The President's 'empathy'
standard is antithetical to the proper role of a judge." 155 CONG. REc. S8823 (daily ed.
Aug. 5, 2009). For discussions of empathy in Obama's jurisprudence, see Mitchell F.
Crusto, Obama's Moral Capitalism: Resuscitating the American Dream, 63 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1011, 1022 (2009) (responding to "President Obama's call for empathy in
constitutional jurisprudence"); John Paul Rollert, Reversed on Appeal: The Uncertain
Future of President Obama's "Empathy Standard," 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89 (2010)
(parsing and praising Obama's remarks on empathy).
176. David Brooks, The Empathy Issue, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A25. Brooks
relies upon cultural cognition theory. See Kahan, supra note 7. Sen. Coburn took
exception to that view: "Judge Sotomayor stated prior to her hearing that '[p]ersonal
experiences affect the facts that judges choose to see' and 'our gender and national
origins may and will make a difference in our judging.' It seems to me ... that the facts
of a case are pretty clear and, if a judge is picking and choosing the facts they see based
on their personal experiences, then they cannot possibly be impartial arbiters." 155
CONG. REc. S8823 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009).
177. Kahan, supra note 7, at 416-17 (2009).
178. Id. at 417 ("The essentially factual nature of the disagreement between the
majority and dissent suggests a . . . way in which values might be affecting their
decisions: as a subconscious influence on cognition."). Remarks in the same vein by Ms.
Sotomayor were singled out for criticism by Sen. Kyl: "After agreeing with law
professors who say that there is no objective stance, only a series of perspectives, no
neutrality, Judge Sotomayor then said, 'I further accept that our experiences as women
and people of color will in some way affect our decisions."' 155 CONG. REc. S8818
(daily ed. Aug. 5, 2009).
179.

EDITH STEIN, ON THE PROBLEM OF EMPATHY 3-11 (Waltraut Stein, trans., ICS

Publications 3d ed. 1989) (1917). See also SAWICKI, supra note 168, at 90-131.

2012]

EMPATHY

1229

this empathic reception than others.' 8 0 Empathic experience is a kind of
vicarious following of the thoughts and feelings of other persons,
including their logical inferences, their perceptions of facts, their
appreciation of values, and the decision processes motivated by those
In this way,
logical, factual, and evaluative apprehensions.""
Conversely, to the extent that the other's
understanding occurs.
experience remains so opaque that empathic following of it falters,
understanding fails.
Empathy is an aid to judgment. "[E]mpathy does and should play
an important, albeit limited role, in a judge's decision making process,"
according to Professor Darrell Miller.' 82 As "the cognitive capacity or
training to imagine oneself in the position of another person,"' 8 3 empathy
has both spontaneous and acquired aspects. Thus, "empathy is easy if
you share either some attribute or experience with another person," yet
human beings can also deliberately "inhibit, modify or stimulate this
Judges "can choose to actively imagine
empathetic process."' 84
themselves in the position of another as compensation for a lack of
previous experience."
B.

Rationales ofJudicialDeference

Stein's and Miller's empathy theories and Kahan's thesis of cultural
cognition can illuminate the substantive judicial deference that has been
180.

Marianne Sawicki, Editor's Introduction to EDITH STEIN, PHILOSOPHY OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND THE HUMANITIES, xv-xix (Mary Catharine Baseheart and Marianne

Sawicki, trans., ICS Publications, 2000) (1922).
181. Id. See also SAWICKI, supra note 168, at 90-108. For the contrasting view that
empathy functions only in grasping socially significant ideas, see Benjamin Zipursky,
Deshaney and the Jurisprudenceof Compassion, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1101, 1134 (1990)
("Empathy [is] a requirement for grasping a wide range of social and normative
concepts.").
182. Darrell A. H. Miller, lqbal and Empathy, 78 UMKC L. REv. 999, 1001 (2010).
Miller argues that the heightened pleading standard recently announced in 1qbal makes
empathy an indispensible "tool" if judges are to discern whether facts as pleaded are
"plausible." Id. at 1001, 1003. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell
Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007). See also infra Part 1II.D.
183. Miller, supra note 182, at 1008.
184. Id. at 1010.
185. Id. Judges "can compensate for lack of personal experience with an active
empathetic process, and . . . they can develop a coordinate ability to suspend the
empathetic process when it begins to trigger bias." Id. at 1011. On the selective empathy
of judges, see also Susan A. Bandes, Empathetic Judging and the Rule of Law, 2009
CARDozo L. REV. DE NOVO 133, 138 (2009) ("Those who spend their days surrounded by
people with shared backgrounds, assumptions and perspectives may mistake their own
perspective for the universal. This mistake is an occupational hazard for judges."); Terry
A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62 VAND. L. REv. 851,
880 (2009) ("One's worldview determines with whose emotional reality one naturally
will empathize.").
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noted in Overton, Banks, and Singer.186 In each of those cases, the court
exhibited a dearth of empathic understanding with regard to prison
life.'
This deficit can come to light through a careful reading of the
opinions while attending to their rhetorical framing of facts and their
often simplistic rationales for deference. Overton, Banks, and Singer all
applied the Turner factors, which call for a modicum of imagination and
common sense to distinguish between "rational" and "arbitrary"
regulations.' 88 Although "rational basis" is the least strict form of
scrutiny when constitutional rights are infringed,189 any degree of
scrutiny without empathy leads to intolerable and sometimes risible
results. 190
1.

Overton v. Bazetta

In Overton, prisoner Michelle Bazzetta unsuccessfully sought
visiting privileges for babies and children who, though they did not fit
within certain familial categories, were relatives whom the prisoner
desired to see.'91 Recognition of that desire is reflected nowhere in the
Court's remarks.192 The majority characterized children primarily as
disruptive elements who threatened prison security.193 "The regulations
[banning some young relatives] promote internal security . .. by limiting
the disruption caused by children."' 94 The ' Overton majority also
assumed that the non-contact visiting room was a dangerous place
despite supervision by guards.19 5 "[R]educing the number of children

186. See supra Part II.B.
187. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 135 (1995) (suggesting that a
prisoner and an infant relative could maintain their relationship by passing messages back
and forth through a third party).
188. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). The Turner reasonableness
standard can be summarized for convenience under four points: prison interest,
alternatives for prisoners, ripple effect, and alternatives for the prison. See supra Part
I.B.
189. "[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the
regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. . . .
Subjecting the day-to-day judgments of prison officials to an inflexible strict scrutiny
analysis would seriously hamper their ability to anticipate security problems and to adopt
innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration." Id. at 89
(emphasis added).
190. "Alice-in-wonderland legal analysis" was the characterization offered by one
commentator. See Stanley Wu, PersonaNon Grata in the Courts: The Disappearanceof
Prisoners' First Amendment Constitutional Rights in Beard v. Banks, 28 WHITTIER L.
REv. 981, 1001 (2007).
191. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
192. Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (1995).
193. Id. at 133.
194. Id.
195. Id. ("Protecting children from harm is also a legitimate goal.").
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allows guards to supervise them better to ensure their safety and to
minimize the disruptions they cause within the visiting areas."l 9 6 But the
Court also stated that supervision of young visitors is the responsibility
of adults who accompany them.' 97 Although prisoners from large
families desired to maintain relationships with nieces, nephews, and sons
and daughters for whom their parental rights had been judicially
terminated, the possible benefit to the children of such relationships was
not considered by the Court.' 98 "[A] line must be drawn" somewhere to
contain the security threat presented by these unruly and disruptive
youngsters.

199

The Court went on to assert that prisoners have other means to
maintain their relationships with the babies and children barred from the
visiting room. 200 "[I]nmates can communicate with those who may not
visit by sending messages through those who are allowed to visit." 2 0 1
This unrealistic suggestion overestimates the communicative capacities
of little children, for whom even the media of letters and phone calls may
prove challenging or altogether inaccessible. The Court rejected this
commonsensical, empathetic concern by stating that "[a]lternatives to
visitation need not be ideal, however; they need only be available." 202
In contexts other than prison, the Court has shown solicitude for the
needs of family members to stay in touch.203 However, in the prison
context the Court found itself able to approve the manipulation of family
relationships as a "management technique." 20 4 Two Justices, Justice
Thomas and Justice Scalia, opined that states are free to design
punishments that deprive children of access to incarcerated relatives.20 5
This result betrays an inability to empathically adopt either the children's
viewpoint or that of the family as a whole. Nor did the Court perceive
the prisoner as a family member whose obligations to nurture the
206
younger generation persist despite incarceration.
196. Id.
197. Id. ("[I]t is reasonable to ensure that the visiting child is accompanied and
supervised by those adults charged with protecting the child's best interests.").
198. Id.
199. Id
200. Id. at 135.
201. Id.

202.

Id.

203. Id. at 131 (citing the historic family rights cases of Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down an ordinance that forbade members of an extended family
to live together) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (acknowledging
natural rights to "marry, establish a home and bring up children")).
204. Overton, 539 U.S. at 134.
205. Id. at 140 (Thomas, J., concurring). See supra notes 76-79.
206. In allowing states to "draw the line" to exclude nieces, nephews, and offspring
with respect to whom parental rights have been terminated, the Court accepted
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Beard v. Banks

The Court in Banks, too, based its deference to prison regulations on
a construal of the facts that fails to understand the process of motivation
from the viewpoint of the prisoner.207 Mr. Banks was incarcerated in a
Long Term Segregation Unit (LTSU), whose "Level 2" inmates were
forbidden newspapers, magazines, and photographs.20 8 The Court
accepted several far-fetched rationales from the prison administration for
this deprivation of media. 20 9 The prison told the Court that a desire for
news and pictures motivated LTSU prisoners to improve their behavior
so as to move to a less restrictive status, while it prevented others from
"backsliding." 21 0 Evidence of any such motivation was largely absent,
inasmuch as three-quarters of those deprived of news, photos, and most
other amenities never improved enough to get them back.211 Confronting
this factual discrepancy, the court made a specious distinction between
"facts" and "matters of professional judgment."212
Deference to a counterfactual professional judgment is inexplicable
apart from a failure of empathy. Had the plurality of the Banks Court
imagined themselves in the place of an LTSU prisoner, they readily
could have seen the negligible motivational potential of news deprivation
in comparison with solitary confinement and the other harsh measures
imposed.213 Lacking empathic insight, the Court ignored the fact of the
failure of motivation. 2 14
uncritically one model of the nuclear family without regard to the extended relationships
that are characteristic of families in several minority ethnic groups. The Court also
turned a blind eye to the many reasons why an incarcerated mother or father might have
lost parental rights without necessarily having lost the emotional attachment of the child
in question.
207. Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
208. See supra notes 76-88 and accompanying text.
209. Banks, 548 U.S. at 530-31.
210. Id. at 531.
211. Id. at 534. The "insufficient evidentiary support" is noted by Wu, supra note
190, at 981.
212. Banks, 548 U.S. at 530 ("[W]e must distinguish between evidence of disputed
facts and disputed matters of professional judgment. In respect to the latter, our
inferences must accord deference to the views of prison authorities."). Wu paraphrases
the inference permitting the substitution of professional judgment for fact: "If the prison
superintendent says it is true, then it must be true. Since the prison superintendent says
that the policy provides an incentive for inmates to rehabilitate, then the policy does so."
Wu, supra note 190, at 1002-03.
213. Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens criticized the "deprivation theory of
rehabilitation" on other grounds. He pointed out that it was intrinsically unlimited and
therefore potentially could justify taking away any and every constitutional right on the
premise that motivation might be thus engendered. Banks, 548 U.S. at 547-48 (Stevens,
J. dissenting).
214. The court below noted additional defects in the motivation theory. No evidence
was presented to show "whether the ban was implemented in a way that could modify
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Another strained argument by the prison also won uncritical
acceptance from the Court. The prison administration claimed that
newspapers in LTSU cells would pose a security threat because they
could be used to start fires or "catapult feces at the guards."2 15 But so
could many other things. Dissenting Justice Stevens took a look around
an LTSU cell from a prisoner's viewpoint, and he saw, imaginatively,
a jumpsuit, a blanket, two bedsheets, a pillow case, a roll of toilet
paper, a copy of a prison handbook, ten sheets of writing paper,
several envelopes, carbon paper, three pairs of socks, three
undershorts and three undershirts, . . . religious newspapers, legal
periodicals, a prison library book, Bibles, and a lunch tray with a
plate and a cup.216
From the viewpoint of the prisoner, which Justice Stevens empathically
assumed, many of the items readily at hand in an LTSU cell lend
themselves to fire-starting and feces-hurling. 2 17 Thus, newspapers and
photos would not significantly increase the risk.2 18
One striking aspect of the Banks plurality opinion is its
demonization of prisoners housed in the LTSU. 2 19 Besides starting fires
and launching fecal material through the air, the LTSU prisoners are
depicted as "specially dangerous and recalcitrant inmates." 220 They are
"most incorrigible" and they may have attacked someone "with the intent
to cause death or serious bodily injury." 2 2 1 They may belong to a gang,

behavior, or ... whether the [Department of Corrections'] deprivation theory of behavior
modification had any basis in real human psychology, or had proven effective with LTSU
inmates." Id at 535 (majority opinion) (alteration in original).
215. Id. at 531.
216. Id at 543-44 (adopting language from the opinion below).
217. As one commentator has noted, "the dissent used logic and experience to
find ... problems with the justifications put forth by the administrators [and made] a
more searching inquiry behind the prison administrators' justifications." Jennifer N.
Wimsatt, Rendering Turner Toothless: The Supreme Court's Decision in Beard v. Banks,
57 DuKE L.J. 1209, 1240-41.
218. In a separate dissent, Justice Ginsburg also seems willing and able to adopt a
prisoner's-eye view to detect a certain irony. "The regulation denies The Christian
Science Monitor to inmates . . . but allows them The Jewish Daily Forward, based on the
determination of a prison official that the latter qualifies as a religious publication and the
former does not. Prisoners are allowed to read Harlequin romance novels, but not to
learn about the war in Iraq or Hurricane Katrina." Banks, 548 U.S. at 555 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). See also Wu, supra note 190, at 1000 (noting "the paucity of evidence
proving that there were problems caused by inmates['] possessing magazines,
newspapers, or photographs").
219. Banks, 548 U.S. at 525.
220. Id. Although this description may be objectively accurate, the effect of this
characterization and the following ones is to rhetorically construct the prisoners as
fearsome and alien.
221. Id. at 525-26.
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"exert[] negative influence," or be "sexual predator[s]." 222 Like savages
in a jungle, they fashion "spears" or "blow guns" from available
materials; that is what they would do with newspapers and photos if they
could get their hands on them.22 3 Given this vilification, the Justices in
the plurality did not imagine that LTSU prisoners might simply want to
read the news or a sports magazine, like anyone else.
The demonization of prisoners climbs toward hysteria in the
concurring opinion of Justice Thomas.224 He blamed the Court for a
deadly race riot in a California prison because the riot followed upon the
Court's ruling that incoming prisoners may not be racially segregated.225
Hence, Justice Thomas opened with a dire warning against any review of
prison regulations at all: "Judicial scrutiny of prison regulations is an
endeavor fraught with peril."226 On that basis, he reprised his concurring
opinion in Overton to the effect that states should have a free hand in
designing the details of prison punishments.22 7
3.

Singer v. Raemisch

Singer, a recent opinion in which the Seventh Circuit relied heavily
on Overton and Banks, further illustrates the nexus between substantive
deference to prison authorities and failure of empathic insight into
prisoners' experience.228 Mr. Singer's fantasy books, magazines, and
manuscript were confiscated after a Wisconsin prison instituted a policy

222. Id. at 526.
223. Id at 531 (citing the statement of undisputed facts in the appendix to the
Appeal).
224. Id at 536-41 (Thomas, J. concurring).
At the time of Justice Thomas'
appointment to the Court, many expected him to base his opinions in part on empathy.
That expectation was disappointed. See Eric L. Muller, Where But for the Grace of God
Goes He? The Searchfor Empathy in the Criminal Justice Jurisprudence of Clarence
Thomas, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 225, 230 (1998) ("[Thomas] has yet to broaden the range
of his empathy much beyond his own unique circumstances."). But see Steven B.
Lichtman, Black Like Me: The Free Speech Jurisprudence of Clarence Thomas, 114
PENN ST. L. REV. 415, 417 (2009) ("The scholarship on Thomas is complicated....
Little of the writing aspires to neutrality; much of it is either hagiography or polemic.");
Nicole Stelle Garnett, "But for the Grace of God There Go I": Justice Thomas and the
Little Guy, 4 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 626 (2009) (defending Thomas' concern for the
disadvantaged).
225. Banks, 548 U.S. at 536-37 (Thomas, J. concurring). See Johnson v. California,
543 U.S. 499 (2005) (remanding for strict scrutiny of a policy that segregated newly
arrived inmates by race).
226. Banks, 548 U.S. at 536.
227. Id. at 536-42. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 140 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring). See also supranotes 76-79.
228. Singer v. Raemisch, 593 F.3d 529 (7th Cir. 2010).
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against the game Dungeons and Dragons (D&D).
described the game in neutral terms:

22 9

The court at first

A typical D & D game is made up of an "adventure," or single story
that players develop as a group. A related series of games and
adventures becomes a "campaign." The fictional locations in which
the adventures and campaigns take place-ranging in size and
complexity from cities to entire universes-are called "campaign
settings."230
But the court went on to associate the game with several violent criminal
cases. 23 1 In the first case, the defendant 'was obsessed with Dungeons
and Dragons' and 'retreat[ed] into a fantasy world of Ninja warriors"'
because of his obsession. 2 32 In the second, "two men ... brought a D &
D adventure to life by entering the home of an elderly couple and
assassinating them." 23 3 In the third selection, the defendant had "argued
that ... addiction to D & D dictated his actions and disconnected him
from any consciousness of wrongdoing or responsibility for three
murders."23 4 The court's final selection was a civil action brought after a
teenager who was a "devoted" D&D player committed suicide because
he supposedly "became absorbed by the game to the point of losing
touch with reality."235 The rhetoric of violence and danger built in a
crescendo throughout the court's recitation of these cases. 2 36
Although the court had before it fifteen affidavits attesting to the
value of D&D and its rehabilitative potential, the opinion contains barely
a hint of their content, which presumably was positive and upbeat.237
"[The] eleven inmate affiants-who collectively served over 100 years in
prison-all testified that they had never heard of any gang-related or
other violent activity associated with D&D gameplay or
paraphernalia." 23 8 Three of Mr. Singer's other four affiants were experts
on role-play games, but the court cited their expert views only

229. Id See supra notes 98-113 and accompanying text.
230. Singer, 593 F.3d at 531 n.1.
231. Id. at 537 (citing Meyer v. Branker, 506 F.3d 358, 370 (4th Cir. 2007) and
Thompson v. Dixon, 987 F.2d 1038, 1039 (4th Cir. 1993)).
232. See Meyer, 506 F.3d at 370 (cited by Singer, 593 F.3d at 537).
233. See Thompson, 987 F.2d at 1039 (cited by Singer, 593 F.3d at 537).
234. See Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1335 (10th Cir. 1998) (cited by Singer, 593
F.3d at 537).
235. See Watters v. TSR, Inc., 904 F.2d 378, 380 (6th Cir. 1990) (cited by Singer, 593
F.3d at 537).
236. Singer v. Raemisch, 539 F.3d 529, 537 (7th Cir. 2010).
237. "Singer procured an impressive trove of affidavit testimony." Singer, 593 F.3d
at 536.
238. Id.
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sparingly.239 Although the opinion adopted few of the presumably
positive descriptions from Singer's affidavits,2 40 it did include the dire
warnings set forth in an affidavit from the prison's local gang specialist
as the prison's "sole evidence."2 4'
He testified that D & D can "foster an inmate's obsession with
escaping from the real life, correctional environment, fostering
hostility, violence and escape behavior," which in turn "can
compromise not only the inmate's rehabilitation and effects of
positive programming but also endanger the public and jeopardize the
safety and security of the institution." 42
The court remarked that the specialist, an employee of the prison, had
advised Singer that D&D "promotes fantasy role playing, competitive
hostility, violence, addictive escape behaviors, and possible
gambling."24 3 All in all, the comments chosen for inclusion in the
opinion serve rhetorically to amplify the court's damning identification
of D&D with violence and danger.
Explaining its choice to credit the prison's one affidavit instead of
the fifteen submitted by Mr. Singer, the court stated that the prisoners'
244
It came "from the wrong side of the
experience was not relevant.
24 5
This remark is an overgeneralization, inasmuch as four of
bars."
Singer's affidavits came from knowledgeable individuals who were not
246
But the
incarcerated, that is, who lived on the right side of the bars.
in
the
court
for
descriptions
of
negative
the
salience
remark illuminates
239. Id at 532. The court notes testimony from "Paul Cardwell, chair and archivist of
the Committee for the Advancement of Role-Playing Games, an 'international network of
researchers into all aspects of role-playing games,"' to the effect that "there are numerous
scholarly works establishing that role-playing games can have positive rehabilitative
effects on prisoners." Id. at 537.
240.

The opinion remarks that "[s]everal of Singer's affiants ...

asserted . .. that

D&D helps rehabilitate inmates and prevents them from joining gangs and engaging in
other undesirable activities." Id. at 533.
241. Id. at 535. The specialist was the prison's "long-serving Disruptive Group
Coordinator, Captain Bruce Muraski." Id. at 532. He "has spent nearly twenty years as
Waupun's Disruptive Group Coordinator and Security Supervisor and belongs to both the
Midwest Gang Investigators Association and the Great Lakes International Gang
Investigators Coalition. Muraski also has extensive training in illicit groups ranging from
nationwide street and prison gangs to small occult groups and has been certified as a gang
specialist by the National Gang Crime Research Center." Id. at 533. In spite of that
training, Muraski apparently took no action with respect to D&D until he received an
anonymous letter from a prisoner suggesting its potential encouragement of gangs. Id. at
532.
242. Id. at 535.
243. Id. at 532.
244. Id. at 536.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 533.
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contrast to the positive descriptions that it could have gleaned from the
fifteen affiants who purported to have first-hand experience of the game
and its effect on players.
That salience may be owing to "cultural cognition."2 4 7 "The
phenomenon of cultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to
conform their views about risks and benefits of putatively dangerous
activities to their cultural evaluations of those activities." 248 Facts impact
upon perception selectively through a lens of cultural experience, even
when judges attempt to view matters objectively.249
The court sought to further justify its selectivity under Banks's
distinction between "facts" and "matters of professional judgment."250 A
fact-the utter lack of evidence linking D&D to gang activity-was
outweighed by a professional judgment-speculation that D&D might
possibly foster gang activity in future. 2 5 1 This speculation rested on the
prison expert's observation that D&D "mimicked" gang organization,
with rules and a hierarchical leadership structure.252 Thus, speculation by
a prison staff member carried more weight with the court than sworn
factual statements about experience "from the wrong side of the bars."253
Commonality of experience is the gateway of understanding.254 The
Singer court failed to grasp any difference between the fantasy of escape
in a D&D role play, on one hand, and an actual plan of escape from
prison itself, on the other. It relied on a prison employee's statement
"that D & D can 'foster an inmate's obsession with escaping from the
real life[] correctional environment, fostering hostility, violence and
escape behavior.'"255 By discounting the prisoners' affidavits, the court
deprived itself of empathic access to prisoner experience. The threat of
D&D then became a judicially recognized fact. Consequently, the court
approved the prison's effort to extinguish fantasy.

247. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
248. Kahan, supra note 177, at 417-18.
249. Id. at 420. Values may affect judicial decisions "as a subconscious influence on
creates conflict over legally
cognition." Id. at 417. "[C]ultural cognition ...
consequential facts." Id. at 418.
250. Singer, 593 F.3d at 534 (citing Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 530 (2006)). The
court goes on to state that "[o]ur inferences as to disputed matters of professional
judgment are governed by Overton." Id. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 132
(2003). See also supra note 212 and accompanying text.
251. Singer, 593 F.3d at 536-37.

252. Id.
253. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
254. See Miller, supra note 182, at 1008 ("Empathy is essential to overcoming the
limitations of experience. By making conscious effort to imagine themselves in the
position of another, judges can arrive at better estimations of whether a set of facts, taken
as true, present a plausible claim.").
255. Singer, 593 F.3d at 535.
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Deference and Empathy in Burns

Ironically, a certain capacity for fantasy and imagination is a
prerequisite for empathic access to the life experiences of other human
One understands another's viewpoint by imaginatively
beings. 256
stepping into his or her shoes. Judges do not readily imagine themselves
257
But aspects of prison
in the place of incarcerated individuals.
experience can be rendered empathically accessible through analogy with
experiences outside prison walls, as happened in Burns v. Pennsylvania
Dep 't of Corr.2 58 This section explores the role of judicial empathy in
Burns, a rare decision that favored a prisoner.
1.

Procedural history of Burns

The facts of the Burns case are straightforward, but its progress
through the federal courts has been complex. While Rodney Burns was
incarcerated in Pennsylvania's State Correctional Institution at
Graterford, someone injured Charles Mobley, another prisoner, by
scalding him with hot water.259 Mr. Mobley was elderly and somewhat
frail. 2 60 His identification of his assailant was tentative, and he refused to
testify at the misconduct hearing where Mr. Burns was found responsible
for the scalding. 26 1 The hearing officer relied on reports of unidentified
informants, whom she did not summon to testify. 2 62 Their reports
entered the record through the prison's security officer, who had received
them and who indicated that he believed they were reliable.263
Videotapes of the incident, which may once have existed, were not
available by the time of the hearing.264

See STEIN, supra note 179, at 8-11.
257. An exception that fairly proves the rule is Leland P. Anderson, A "More
Excellent Way ": Moral Imagination & the Art ofJudging,22 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 399 (2008). But see Catherine Gage O'Grady, Empathy and Perspective in
Judging: The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4 (2001). See also
Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as ConstitutionalLaw, 26 VAND. L. REV.
851, 880 (2009).
258. Burns v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2008).
259. Burns, 544 F.3d at 281-82. See also Appellant's Brief and Attached Appendix at
5, Bums v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 07-1678).
260. Brief for Appellees at 10, Burns v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279
(3d Cir. 2008) (No 07-1678).
261. Burns, 544 F.3d at 282.
262. Id. at 282-83.
263. Id.
264. Id at 282. See also Appellant's Brief, supra note 259, at 6 ("[T]he Security
Captain at SCI Graterford . . . informed Bums that the assault had been recorded on
videotape.").
256.

2012]

EMPATHY

1239

The hearing officer determined that Mr. Bums was guilty of
assaulting Mr. Mobley.2 65 She imposed a penalty of 180 days in
disciplinary confinement and the forfeiture of Bums's prison job.266 She
also "assessed" his prison account for whatever medical expenses or
other expenses might result from the assault. 267 However, no funds were
actually taken.26 8
"Bums timely appealed the disciplinary conviction through all three
levels of disciplinary appeals," and it was upheld at each level. 2 69 He
then filed a civil rights complaint pro se in federal court under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983.270 Subsequently, the court appointed counsel. 27 1 "[T]he parties
filed cross-motions for summary judgment [and] the district court denied
Mr. Bums's motion for partial summary judgment and granted the
defendants' motion."272
An appeal followed.273 The court below had based its judgment on
the fact that no funds actually had been deducted from Mr. Bums's
27427
With nothing taken, no process was due.275 But Bums
account2.
argued that he "was deprived [of] his right to security in the funds in his
inmate account, one of the essential sticks in the property ownership
bundle of rights." 276 The Third Circuit accepted that argument. 27 7 It
reversed the summary judgment and sent the case back to the district
court.2 7 8 The district court once again granted summary judgment to the
defendants on most counts.279 However, it also granted partial summary
judgment to the plaintiff, Bums, with respect to the favorable finding that
is under discussion here.280

265. Burns, 544 F.3d at 283.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 282-83. Mr. Mobley received only one treatment with ointment and a
tetanus shot. Id at 282. See also Brief for Appellees, supra note 260, at 11.
268. Burns, 544 F.3d at 283.
269. Appellant's Brief, supra note 259, at 11-12.
270. Id. at 3.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 4.
273. Id.
274. The district court "held that Burns was not entitled to ... due process protections
because he failed to show a deprivation of a cognizable liberty or property interest."
Burns, 544 F.3d at 281. See Burns v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 05-3462, 2007
WL 442385, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 6, 2007) ("Because Plaintiff has suffered no deprivation
of property, he fails as a matter of law to state a due process violation.").
275. Id.
276. Appellant's Brief, supra note 259, at 15.
277. Burns, 544 F.3d at 291.
278. Id.
279. Burns, 2009 WL 1475274, at *18.
280. Id.
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The Court DECLARES that [the hearing officer's] failure to
independently assess the reliability and credibility of the confidential
informants whose testimony she relied upon in assessing Plaintiffs
inmate account violated the procedural due process rights Plaintiff
was entitled to given his protectedproperty interest in the security of
his inmate account.281

The judgment was appealed once more to the Third Circuit, which
confirmed the novelty of the new property right but granted more relief
to Burns in that it expunged his prison disciplinary record.282
2.

Empathy in Burns

Strikingly scarce in the initial remand was any mention of deference
owed to prison administrators.2 83 The Third Circuit implicitly criticized
the prison's disciplinary proceedings by pointing out that the court below
"had 'serious concerns that Defendants' actions would not satisfy even
those minimal due process requirements [guaranteed to persons in
prison]."' 28 4 Nevertheless, the district court initially did not reach the
issue of defects in the disciplinary proceedings because it found that
Bums "failed to show a deprivation of a cognizable liberty or property
interest" by means of those defective proceedings. 28 5 The latter point
was the error identified by the Third Circuit.2 86 Finding that the
"assessment" of Burns's account did indeed deprive him of a property

281. Id. (emphasis added).
282. Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 642 F.3d 163, 171 (2011).
283. Neither the majority opinion nor the dissent made use of the concept. The term
"deference" appeared in only one citation of a Supreme Court case, although that passage
was cited twice by the dissent and twice by the majority in response. Burns, 544 F.3d at
290 n.8, 293, 294. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 482 (1995) ("[F]ederal courts
ought to afford appropriate deference and flexibility to state officials trying to manage a
volatile environment [and avoid] involvement of federal courts in the day-to-day
management of prisons."). However, when deciding the second appeal, the Third Circuit
sounded a lone note of empathy when it remarked that "an inmate's prison account may
be the only means of paying for long distance phone calls to family or others in his/her
support network." Burns, 642 F.3d at 172 n.9.
284. Burns, 544 F.3d at 281 (internal citations omitted). The court also took a dim
view of the defendants' attempt to render the appeal moot by belatedly promising not to
deduct any funds. Id. at 283-85 ("[B]ecause of the belated nature of the assurancewhich was offered more than three years after the original disciplinary hearing and only
after oral argument was heard in this case-it is possible that Burns is entitled to a more
than nominal award as compensation for the time that his inmate account operated under
a cloud.").
285. Id. at 281.
286. Id. ("Because we believe that the Department of Corrections' assessment of
Bums'[s] inmate account constituted the impairment of a cognizable property interest, we
will reverse the District Court's . . . order granting summary judgment and remand the
case for further proceedings.").
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interest, the appeals court remanded for an examination of the
sufficiency of the disciplinary proceedings that had imposed the
"assessment." 28 7 On remand, the result favored Bums on that point.2 88
Also conspicuous by its absence from the Burns opinion is the sort
of rhetorical demonization of prisoners that accompanied and supported
substantive deference toward prison authorities in Overton, Banks, and
Singer.28 9 On the contrary, the majority seemed imaginatively to find
common ground with the prisoner's experience by analogizing it to more
familiar financial affairs. 2 90 Thus, the court readily could conceptualize
an injury that Bums experienced. The injury was that once his account
was assessed for an as yet undetermined amount, he was "faced with
either constantly spending down his account, or potentially losing a
portion of his funds through the Department of Corrections'
discretionary execution of its assessment."2 91 The assessment itself,
imposed at the time of the disciplinary hearing as a "cloud" over the
account, immediately deprived Bums of a property interest in the future
use of his funds, though not of the funds themselves.292
Notwithstanding the likelihood that the amount of the assessment
would have been "negligible,"29 3 the court exerted itself to conduct a
detailed theoretical analysis of property rights and economic
287. Id. at 291.
288. Bums v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., No. 05-3462, 2009 WL 1475274, at *18
(E.D. Pa., May 26, 2009) (declaring that prison officials "violated [Bums's] procedural
due process rights").
289. See supra Part II.B.
290. The analogy was suggested to the court by the Appellant's Brief. Burns, 544
F.3d at 288 ("Burns contends that the assessment placed the Department of Corrections in
a position analogous to that of a Judgment Creditor.") (emphasis added). The Third
Circuit again pointed to this illuminating analogy in its second Burns decision, 642 F.3d
at 178, 179. In fact, the Appellant's Brief, supra note 259, at 18, states that the
assessment literally created a "judgment debt" and "the DOC became a judgment
creditor."
291. Burns, 544 F.3d at 290.
292. Id. at 290 n.8. The court summarized its holding:
[T]he Department of Corrections' assessment of Bums' institutional
account . . . deprived him of a protected property interest where that assessment
(1) placed the DOC in a position analogous to that of a Judgment Creditor;
(2) clouded Bums's account for a period of more than three years; and
(3) reduced the economic value and utility of that account.
Id.
293. Brief for Appellees, supra note 260, at 32 n.26 ("[Defendants asserted that] the
cost of a dollup of triple anti-biotic ointment and a dose of Tetanus vaccine-all that was
expended to treat Mobley-was undoubtedly negligible."). But as the Third Circuit
explained in its second decision, "when [the hearing officer] assessed Bums' account, she
believed that the assessment could be much larger than $10.00, possibly including the
costly prospect of covering plastic surgery Mobley may have needed. . .. Thus, although
we now know that Bums' exposure was less than $10, the exposure appeared far more
substantial at the time of the hearing." Burns, 642 F.3d at 172-73.
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relationships. It drew upon the philosophical work of A.M. Honord for
the notion that a "right to security" is one of the "bundle of sticks" that
comprise property rights.294 The court quotes Honord to the effect that
an owner "should be able to look forward to remaining owner
indefinitely." 295 The court went on to cite two microeconomics
textbooks in support of the proposition that "property subject to
seizure-even if the probability and timing of such a seizure is
unknown-possesses a lesser present day economic value than property
not so encumbered." 29 6 Like a judgment of indebtedness, the assessment
of Bums's account diminished its value and utility for him. 2 97 The
court's painstaking financial and philosophical analysis is remarkably
sympathetic to Bums's predicament.
The court's ability to adopt the prisoner's perspective goes far to
explain the vastly different result in Burns, when compared with the
deferential holdings of more typical cases like Overton, Banks, and
Singer.298
D.

The Meaning and Implications ofBurns

The surprising result in Burns bears further analysis to assess its
import for future litigation over prisoners' rights. As a practical effect,
henceforward any adjudication that so much as hints at confiscation of a
prisoner's funds will be ultimately reviewable by an Article III court.299
In addition to its practical impact on prison administrative law, Burns

294. Burns, 544 F.3d at 287. See A.M. Honor6, Ownership, OXFORD ESSAYS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest, ed. 1961). The court also looked to Lawrence Becker
to define the right of security as "immunity from expropriation." 544 F.3d at 288. See
LAWRENCE C. BECKER, PROPERTY RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS 19 (1977).
295. Burns, 544 F.3d at 288. See Honord,supra note 294.
296. Burns, 544 F.3d at 289. "Mathematically, the expected value of an account that
is currently worth V but is subject to seizure would therefore equal P*(V) + (1-P)*(V-the
amount seized), where 'P' equals the probability that the seizure will not be effectuated."
Id.
297. The court concedes that the analogy of a judgment creditor is imperfect, but
points out that the prison has even more power over Bums's funds than a conventional
creditor would have.
[T]he Department of Corrections-unlike a putative Judgment Creditorcontrols the process through which the amount of medical expenses will be
determined. As such, they possess the unilateral authority to reduce their
Similarly, the Department of
assessment to a specific dollar amount.
Corrections need not rely on third party enforcement of their assessment
interest. Instead, they physically control Burns'[s] institutional account and can
deduct any assessed fees without resort to an intermediary.
Id. at 288-89.
298. See supra Part III.B.
299. This will be so at least in the Third Circuit, where Burns is authoritative
precedent. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, § 2, cl. 1.
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illuminates the role of empathy in the four-pronged Turner test that
courts apply to prisoners' constitutional claims.3 0 0 This section addresses
in turn these theoretical and administrative concerns: the constitutional
jurisprudence of empathy and the practical impact of Burns. However,
preliminary remarks establish the continuing viability of the Turner test
in light of recent assertions that Turner was eviscerated if not overruled
by Banks.30 1
1.

The Turner Framework

For nearly twenty-five years, the touchstone for permissible
infringement of constitutional rights in prison has been the fourfold test
set forth in Turner.30 2 A Turner analysis weighs four factors to evaluate
the constitutionality of a prison regulation or practice: (1) whether the
regulation is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective;
(2) whether other means exist for the prisoner to exercise the infringed
right; (3) whether allowing the prohibited behavior would have a
negative impact throughout the prison; and (4) whether other means exist
for the prison to accomplish its objective.303
Turner remains good law, even though several commentators
hastily concluded that the Banks Court collapsed the four factors into
This mistaken
simple deference toward prison administrators. 3 04
conclusion emerges from efforts to account for the inordinately
deferential weight that Banks gave to the first factor, the prison's ability
to articulate a legitimate penological purpose for the regulation
challenged. 30 5 However, a more satisfactory explanation of the hyperdeference in Banks is available on the basis of a jurisprudence of
300. For discussion of the Turner test, see supra Part IIA-B.
301. See supra Part II.B-C for discussion of Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521 (2006).
302. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
303. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
304. See Melissa Rivero, Melting in the Hands of the Court: M&M's, Art, and a
Prisoner's Right to Freedom of Expression, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 811, 831 (2008)
("[U]nless the connection between the challenged regulation and the interest is invalid,
the Court will not address the other [Turner] factors."); Wimsatt, supra note 217, at 1231
("[A] majority of the Court . . . implemented a test that eliminated three of the Turner
factors.") (citations omitted). See also Jeremy T. Sellars, Judicial Deference to the
Professional Judgment of Prison Officials-First Amendment Validity of Prison
Regulations Barring Newspapers, Magazines, and PersonalPhotographs, 74 TENN. L.
REv. 711, 726 (2007) ("Even with the factors developed in Turner, the reasonableness
standard used by the Court does not adequately protect basic rights assured to prisoners
under the United States Constitution."); Wu, supra note 190, at 984, 1006 ("[T]he Court
analyzed each factor under Turner" but succumbed to "an absolute bias completely in
favor of prison administration interests.").
305. Of the four authors cited supra note 304, Rivero and Wimsatt believe that this
was effectively the only factor considered, while Sellars and Wu conclude that it was
given inordinate weight.
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empathy.30 6 Moreover, federal appellate and district courts in 2010
continued to apply the four prongs of the Turner test when prisoners
alleged violations of their constitutional rights. 307 Although Turner is
still good law, effective application of its criteria depends upon the
empathy brought to the case by counsel and judges alike.
The implicit and often unsuspected place of empathy as a
component of jurisprudence received scholarly attention in Professor
Darrell Miller's analysis of "plausibility," the heightened pleading
standard announced in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.30 8 Miller argued that because
empathy cannot be eliminated from human choices, judges ought to
recognize its role, bring it to consciousness, and "harness it." 309
Empathy is "the cognitive capacity or trainingto imagine oneself in
the position of another person." 3 10 It can mean "perspective taking: the
conscious ability to infer the mental or emotional state of another person,
without necessarily sharing the other's emotional state or desiring to help
that other person."3 11 In the narrow context of a motion to dismiss a
complaint for failure to state a claim, Miller remarks that
judges will likely make more accurate decisions based on morerather than less-information, that they are more likely to understand
the motives of a party if they share some common experience or
characteristic with that party, that they can compensate for lack of

306. This jurisprudence will be discussed presently. The role of empathy in Burns
can illuminate the lopsided reliance of Banks on the first Turner factor, despite the fact
that the Burns Court did not reach a Turner analysis of whether the prisoner's property
was taken improperly. It merely established that the prisoner had a property interest that
could be and was infringed.
307. See, e.g., Watkins v. Kasper, 599 F.3d 791, 796-98 (7th Cir. 2010) (reversing
jury verdict in favor of prisoner against whom disciplinary action was taken for
complaining in a manner deemed inappropriate when analyzed by the Turner factors,
hence not constitutionally protected); Bull v. San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc) (relying on three of the four Turner factors to uphold the constitutionality of
strip searches for arrestees while overruling 1980's-era precedents that had provided
broader protections for prisoners); Maze v. Tafolla, 369 F.App'x 532, 534 (5th Cir. 2010)
(unpublished) (using the Turner factors to justify denial of contact visits with two-yearold daughter for mother charged with murder and awaiting trial in county jail); Johnson
v. Cate, No. C 10-01273, 2010 WL 2681710 (N.D. Calif. July 6, 2010) (dismissing
prisoner's equal protection challenge to policy that denied him free textbooks after a
Turner analysis of the claims).
308. Miller, supra note 182. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text. See
also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007).
309. Miller, supra note 182, at 1011. See also Bandes and Maroney, supranote 185.
310. Miller, supra note 182, at 1008 (emphasis added).
311. Miller, supra note 182, at 1009 (citing the research of Frederique de Vignemont
& Tania Singer, The Empathetic Brain: How, When and Why?, Opinion, 10 TRENDS IN
COGNITIVE Sci. 435, 435 (2006) and Stephanie D. Preston & Frans B. M. de Waal,
Empathy: Its Ultimate and ProximateBases, 25 BEHAV. & BRAIN Sci. 1, 4 tbl. 2 (2002)).
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personal experience with an active empathetic process, and that they
can develop a coordinate ability to suspend the empathetic process
when it begins to trigger bias. 312
If judges need more information, then the parties need to supply it in the
pleadings;313 hence the heightened "plausibility pleading standard"
announced in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly314 and confirmed in Iqbal.315
2.

Empathy and the Turner Factors

Although Miller's focus was on pleading standards in general, his
analysis readily extends itself to the four prongs of the Turner test for
unconstitutional infringement of prisoner's rights. Implicit in the Turner
factors are the imperatives of empathy enumerated by Professor Miller:
to understand motives, to imaginatively take on the different perspectives
of the parties, to augment one's own personal experience with that of
others, and to recognize and avoid bias.31 6 These dimensions of empathy
are constitutive ingredients in the Turner factors as stated in principle.
The first and fourth factors call upon judges to understand motives,
specifically the "legitimate governmental interest" that is the "asserted
goal" of the challenged regulation. 318 This understanding is the basis on
which to assess the strength of the rational connection between the
312. Miller, supra note 182, at 1011. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 8(a)(2).
313. Catherine G. O'Grady points out that "appellate judges will use the parties'
briefs and oral arguments as tools to assist them in obtaining their own empathic
understandings of the case." Catherine Gage O'Grady, Empathy and Perspective in
Judging: The Honorable William C. Canby, Jr., 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 4, 15 (2001).
314. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
315. Miller, supra note 182, at 1001, with reference to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
1937 (2009). But see Miller, supra note 175, at 1011.
Where Iqbal goes wrong is in its articulation of a standard that seems to
privilege experience, without demanding impartiality. Iqbal seems to invite
judges to determine plausibility based upon their own experience, rather than
forcing them to do the hard work to imagine themselves in the scenario
presented within the four corners of the complaint.
Id.
316. See supra notes 308-15 and accompanying text.
317. In practice, conversely, a Turner analysis goes awry to the extent that it neglects
to empathize with the parties on either side of the dispute. Dissenting in Turner, Justice
Stevens pointed to the danger of lopsided empathy. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 10001 (1987) (Stephens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The standard adopted
by the majority
would seem to permit disregard for inmates' constitutional rights whenever the
imagination of the warden produces a plausible security concern and a
deferential trial court is able to discern a logical connection between that
concern and the challenged regulation. Indeed, there is a logical connection
between prison discipline and the use of bullwhips on prisoners.
Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined in the Stevens opinion. Id
318. Turner, 482 U.S. at 89.
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prison's objective and the regulation (factor one) in comparison with
possible alternative means of achieving the same objective (factor four).
Understanding of motivation also comes into play when a court explores
why the infringed right is important to the prisoner (factor three).31 9 For
example, the Overton Court apparently failed to grasp the intensity of the
mutual need of prisoners and their young relatives for visits, although it
readily recognized the motivation for banning such visits as articulated
by the prison administration. 32 0
Imaginatively taking on the differing perspectives of the parties is
an imperative that drives several of the Turner factors. The court must
consider alternatives on both sides: whether the prison has other means
to achieve its objective (factor four) and whether the prisoners have other
means to exercise the infringed right (factor two). For example, the
Banks Court found that most prisoners in a restrictive housing unit had
no present or even future alternative means to exercise their
constitutional right to receive news, because most did not improve their
behavior in reaction to the ban on newspapers. 32 1 Nevertheless, the
Court upheld the ban, apparently because the perspective of the prison
administration was easier for the Court to adopt than that of the

prisoners.322
To augment one's experience with that of others is an empathic
imperative that is essential in principle to the application of Turner factor
three.
Yet the Turner majority took a one-sided approach,
acknowledging the value of administrators' experience but not that of
prisoners:
A third consideration is the impact [that] accommodation of the
asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates,
and on the allocation of prison resources generally. In the necessarily
closed environment of the correctional institution, few changes will
have no ramifications on the liberty of others or on the use of the
prison's limited resources for preserving institutional order. When
accommodation of an asserted right will have a significant "ripple
effect" on fellow inmates or on prison staff, courts should be
particularly deferential to the informed discretion of corrections
officials. 323
The metaphor of the "ripple" discloses what the Court overlooked here.
Prisoners themselves first experience the "ripple" because of the

319.
320.
321.
322.
323.

See supra notes 192-206 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text.
Id.
Turner, 482 U.S. at 90.
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infringement of the right that is at issue; hence, they are a source of
information about what this infringement means. Yet the need for such
information may scarcely register with a court. For example, the Singer
court all but ignored the testimony of fifteen affiants about the role324
playing game Dungeons and Dragons.
To recognize and avoid bias is perhaps the most subtle and vital of
the imperatives of empathy. To be sure, the Turner majority embraced
the principle of deference to prison administrators along with the
principle of protecting prisoners' constitutional rights.3 2 5 But deference
is not equivalent to bias against the prisoner and in favor of the state.
Deference does not mandate lopsided empathy with administrators while
ignoring what empathy could disclose about the interests of prisoners.
On the contrary, even-handed empathy is a means of guarding against
bias.326 For example, the Burns court dared to address "an issue of first
impression across the courts of appeals." 3 27 The court engaged in a farreaching dialogue with secondary philosophical sources and with its own
dissenting member after it could find "no precedential authority
addressing the right to security."328
The foregoing discussion of the constitutional jurisprudence of
empathy, inspired by Professor Miller's analysis of empathy as a
component of the plausibility pleading standard, has established that
empathy is also operative in the application of the Turner test for
permissible infringement of prisoner rights. Decisions that demonize
prisoners are decisions that implement the imperatives of empathy
equivocally and without a critical awareness of empathy's inescapable
role in human deliberation. 3 29 By contrast, the Burns court avoided the
unconscious bias that results from taking the perspective of prison
authorities but not the perspective of the prisoner. The familiar analogy

324. See supra notes 228-46 and accompanying text.
325. Turner, 482 U.S. at 84-85.
326. As Professor Miller argues, "humans can employ higher order cognitive
functions to inhibit, modify or stimulate this empathetic process." Miller, supra note
182, at 1010. Miller calls for
minimizing the type of cognitive errors that judges and juries are prone to
make ... [by recognizing] that judges will likely make more accurate decisions
based on more-rather than less-information,

. .

. that they can compensate

for lack of personal experience with an active empathetic process, and that they
can develop a coordinate ability to suspend the empathetic process when it
begins to trigger bias.
Id. at 1011.
327. Bums v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 286 (3d Cir. 2008).
328. Id. at 287. The court looked to the property theory of A.M. Honore to support its
holding in favor of the prisoner. See supra notes 294-95 and accompanying text.
329. See supra Part IIIB, where demonization of the prisoner plaintiff is illustrated in
Overton, Banks, and Singer.

1248

PENN STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 116:4

of the law of debt made prisoner Bums's predicament accessible to the
court's empathic understanding.33 0
3.

The Impact of Burns on Administrative Law

Besides illuminating the jurisprudence of empathy, Burns has
practical implications for administrative law. It narrows the range of
penalties that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections can impose in
a prison disciplinary hearing. 33 1 By statute, "[a]ny final order, decree,
decision, determination or ruling by an agency affecting personal or
property rights" is defined as an "adjudication." 33 2 "Any person
aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth agency . . . [has] the

right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction of such
appeals."333 That court is the Commonwealth Court, which has
"exclusive jurisdiction of appeals from final orders of government
agencies" including "any . .. Commonwealth agency having Statewide

jurisdiction."3 34 However, a line of cases in the 1980's and 1990's called
into question whether the Department of Corrections had the legal status
of an agency.335 In 1998, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania determined
that the Commonwealth Court had neither original nor appellate
jurisdiction in cases arising from decisions of prison disciplinary
tribunals, with the exception of those involving constitutional claims. 33 6
Constitutional claims can arise with regard to the property interest that
was newly declared by the Third Circuit in Burns.337

330. See supra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
331. Misconduct hearings are governed by the Inmate Discipline ProceduresManual,
DC-ADM 801, supra note 120, which became effective June 13, 2008. The manual was
not updated in the wake of the Burns decision, issued September 19, 2008. As a Third
Circuit ruling, Burns similarly affects administrative law in Delaware, New Jersey, and
the Virgin Islands, as well as in Pennsylvania.
332. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 101 (West 2008).
333. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 702 (West 2008).
334. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 763 (a) (West 2004).
335. See Robson v. Biester, 420 A.2d 9, 12 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1980) ("A decision by
an intra-prison disciplinary tribunal is not a final adjudication by an administration
agency within this Court's appellate jurisdiction."); Ricketts v. Cent. Office Review
Comm., 557 A.2d 1180, 1182 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989) ("We are unwilling to elevate the
CORC panel to an administrative agency."). Cf Lawson v. Commonwealth, 538 A.2d
69, 71 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1988) ("[I]f an inmate can identify a personal or property
interest which is not limited by Department regulations and which is affected by a final
decision of the Department, the Department's decision in those circumstances may
constitute an adjudication subject to our appellate review."); Kisner v. Pa. Dep't of Corr.,
683 A.2d 353, 356 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996) ("[W]e conclude that CORC performs statewide policymaking functions, ergo, its decisions are subject to review in this Court's
original jurisdiction.").
336. Bronson v. Cent. Office Review Comm., 721 A.2d 357, 359 (Pa. 1998).
337. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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The exception for constitutional claims accommodates the due
process principles that were affirmed by the Commonwealth Court in a
1996 landmark case in prison administrative law, Holloway v. Lehman.33 8
Under Holloway, Pennsylvania prison administrators cannot deprive
prisoners of their funds without providing the statutory protections of due
process: notice, a hearing with transcribed testimony and opportunity for
cross-examination, and a written decision explaining its reasons.339 Such
a hearing, now commonly called a Holloway hearing, occurs some time
after the disciplinary hearing that initially determined responsibility for
harm done to persons or property.3 40 Its outcome is appealable "to the
courts," 34 ' although no judicial review is available for the findings of the
disciplinary hearing. 34 2
Before Burns, the non-reviewable 3 4 3 disciplinary hearing could
impose financial liability upon a prisoner found responsible for harm to
persons or property, as long as the funds were not actually taken from the
prisoner's account until after a subsequent Holloway hearing.344 That
changed with Burns. The assessment itself now is considered to
diminish a constitutionally protected property interest. 34 5
This outcome leaves two options for the Pennsylvania Department
of Corrections (DOC). Either the DOC must refrain from assessing
damages at all until the Holloway hearing, when all the trappings of due
process are in place; or else the DOC must upgrade the initial
disciplinary hearing so as to provide the statutory protections of notice,

338. Holloway v. Lehman, 671 A.2d 1179 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996). See supra notes
155-63 and accompanying text.
339. Holloway, 671 A.2d at 1182. See 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 504, 505, 507
(West 2008).
340. The Inmate Discipline Procedures Manual, DC-ADM 801, supra note 120,
distinguishes between the misconduct hearing (Section 3) and the cost assessment
hearing (Section 8 C).
341. Idatf8G6.
342. Under Bronson, the Commonwealth Court does not have jurisdiction over prison
disciplinary hearings. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
343. The finding of the disciplinary hearing, or "misconduct hearing," is appealable
within the Department of Corrections to the Program Review Committee, then to the
Facility manager, and finally to the Office of Chief Counsel. DC-ADM 801, supra note
120, at § 5. Under Bronson, it is not appealable to the courts except on constitutional
grounds. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
344. Writing in dissent in Burns, Judge Hardiman pointed out that Mr. Burns was
entitled to a Holloway hearing before the Department of Corrections could touch his
account. "[T]he DOC cannot deprive Bums of funds in his prison account until it
establishes the amount of financial loss or cost, if any. Because it is undisputed that the
DOC never established (or even attempted to establish) this amount, I would hold that
Bums has not suffered a deprivation of property." Bums v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr.,
544 F.3d 279, 295-96 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hardiman, J., dissenting).
345. Bums v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 281 (3d Cir. 2008).
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transcribed testimony, cross examination, and written decision.34 6 In the
latter option, the disciplinary hearing would become judicially
reviewable inasmuch as the assessment itself must be considered an
"adjudication."3 4 7
It seems unlikely that the Pennsylvania DOC will choose between
those options or even recognize that it faces them until forced to do so
through litigation. The impact of Burns has not been immediate. The
DOC has yet to update its Inmate Discipline Procedures Manual, which
still provides for assessment of costs to occur at the initial disciplinary
hearing.348 The Commonwealth Court itself apparently has given Burns
only a cursory reading, for a recent decision distinguished it on
questionable grounds.349
One federal court in Georgia was unimpressed with the decision,
remarking that "the holding in Burns is not controlling in this circuit."350
Nevertheless, the same federal district court looked more kindly on a
poorly drafted habeas action that relied on Burns. 5 In Edinborough v.
Haynes,35 2 the district court pointed out that while a claim of improper
deductions from the prisoner's account was not grounds for a habeas
action, the claim could instead be brought as a Bivens action alleging
violation of constitutional rights.353 Although "Burns is inapplicable to
Edinborough's habeas petition" 354 and the Third Circuit ruling is "non-

346. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 504, 505, 507 (West 2007).
347. 2 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN § 101 (West 2007).
348. See DC-ADM 801, supra note 120, at §§ 8.A-B. The current version of the
Manual is dated June 13, 2008, some three months before the Burns decision.
349. See Jerry v. Dep't of Corr., 990 A.2d 112, 117 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2010), appeal
denied, 12 A.3d 372 (Pa. 2011) (asserting incorrectly that Burns was decided on the basis
of the procedural deficiencies in the disciplinary hearing, not on the basis of the
substantive rights infringed by its outcome).
350. See Robinson v. Haynes, No. CV209-126, 2010 WL 3338814, at *1 (S.D. Ga.
2010).
351. Edinborough v. Haynes, CV210-025, 2010 WL 3291931 (S.D. Ga. June 14,
2010) is the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge.
He noted,
"Edinborough asserts that he is being improperly required to pay his fine at the rate of
from $695 to $786 per month instead of $25 per quarter as recommended by the
sentencing judge." Id. at *1. As recommended, the complaint was dismissed without
prejudice by the court. Edinborough v. Haynes, No. CV210-025, 2010 WL 3291934
(S.D. Ga. Aug. 19, 2010).
352. Id.
353. Id.See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
354. Edinborough, 2010 WL 3291931, at *1.
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binding" on a federal district court in Georgia,3 55 the court hinted that
Burns might be persuasive if cited in a properly drafted complaint.35 6
IV. CONCLUSION

The "new property right"357 declared in Burns seems to have gone
almost unnoticed. The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections did not
revise its disciplinary manual to protect this right, 3 5 8 and a state appellate
court misperceived the significance of the Burns holding. 35 9 Federal
district courts, too, have resisted recognizing the "newness" of the right;
they have referred prisoner-plaintiffs to existing remedies for claims
involving infringement of property interests. 36 0 What, then, is the
significance of Burns?
The significance lies in how-not that-aprisoner achieved judicial
recognition of his security interest in prison account funds. What made
the difference was the pleading of the claim in terms that the court was
able and willing to understand through empathy. Burns is not unusual in
that empathy played a role. As scholars persuasively argue, empathy has
an essential function in all adjudication, whether recognized or not.
The unusual feature of Burns, in comparison with most prisoner
litigation, is that the pleading of the claim made the prisoner's experience
accessible to the court's understanding 3 62 through the analogy of debtor

355. Edinborough, 2010 WL 3291934, at *1.
The magistrate judge's
recommendation mistakenly referred to Burns as an Eighth Circuit opinion. See
Edinborough,2010 WL 3291931, at *1.
356. The hint is implicit in the dismissal without prejudice and the suggestion of the
appropriateness of a Bivens action. See supra note 353. On the other hand, a federal
district court in the Third Circuit held that post-deprivation remedies already were
sufficient to protect the property interest that a prisoner claimed under Burns. See
Morales v. Beard, No. 09-162, 2009 WL 2413425, *1-2 (W.D. Pa. 2009). "Burns did not
address whether the post deprivation process provided via the DOC administrative
grievance procedures or the state law tort suit for conversion were adequate post
deprivation remedies.

. .

. [T]hese post deprivation remedies were adequate." Id. at *1.

The court relied on Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (holding that remedies that
are available after the deprivation of property occurs may afford sufficient due process).
But see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text for the argument that Hudson cannot
apply where funds are taken under an established prison policy.
357. Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 291 (3d Cir. 2008) (Hardiman, J.,
dissenting).
358. See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
359. See supra note 349 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 351-56 and accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 176-82 and accompanying text.
362. Although empathy can entail shared emotion, it is primarily the principle of
shared understanding of matters involving personal value. It is the capacity for
intellectually grasping the experience that someone else has lived. See supra notes 16869, 179-81 and accompanying text.
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and judgment creditor.363 That analogy enabled the court to acquire the
perspective of the prisoner-plaintiff, whose circumstances were
otherwise foreign to judges' experience, and not only the perspective of
defendants, whose social circumstances as prison administrators were
similar to those of judges.
Thus, Burns sheds light on the often unrecognized function of
empathy in adjudication. In particular, it highlights the complementary
duties of bench and bar. Counsel would do well to include accessible
details and analogies in the pleadings.364 Judges, for their part, reel out
or rein in their imaginations to compensate for lopsided affinity of
experience with one of the parties.365 A jurisprudence of empathy
enhances the court's ability to do justice to prisoners and all parties.

363.
364.
365.

See supra notes 290-97 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 182-85.

